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Introduction
Noting that social networks have been paid heavy attention to in recent studies, including economics (see, Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Goyal, 2007; Acemoglu et al., 2010 Acemoglu et al., , 2011 Acemoglu et al., , 2012 Golub and Jackson, 2010) , biology (e.g., Nowak, 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Pacheco et al., 2008; Tarnita et al., 2009; Fu et al., 2010; Allen et al., 2012) , sociology (Zhang, 2004; Jackson, 2008) and physics (Pacheco et al., 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2007) , and the theory about game equilibrium in well-mixed populations has been well-established (see, Weibull, 1995; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003) , the present paper is encouraged to discuss the question that whether or not we can use the game equilibrium derived in well-impact forced on the frequencies individuals meet each other and hence the payoffs individuals finally receive. And it is easily seen that our specification is without loss of generality. In our model, representative players are assumed to maximize the discounted payoffs subject to the belief-learning dynamics, and then the solutions, if exist, form the game equilibrium.
The main result reveals that, in many interesting and also important cases, one can hardly approximate the game equilibrium in social network via the game equilibrium of an ideal random-matching world. In other words, it is reasonable to argue that the game equilibrium in nontrivial social networks would be of independent interest. Moreover, it is illustrated that the game equilibrium is indeed injective map with respect to the socialnetwork effect under consideration. What's the corresponding inspiration? Rather, we may interpret the result as that different social networks yield their independent interest if they produce different (in the sense of our specification in the model) social-network effects. In other words, the uniqueness of the mixed-strategy game equilibrium in a given social network is identified.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. In section 3, we mainly analyze the social-network effect imposed on the game equilibrium defined and derived in section 2. And our major innovations appear in section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper with some remarks.
The Model
We study the social-network effect on game equilibrium in the context of two-player asymmetric normal-form games. Without great loss of generality, one may interpret our background in the evolutionary sense. That is, there are two heterogeneous groups of populations. In particular, there is a representative row-player with m strategies for the first population, while there is a representative column-player with n strategies available for the second group of population. Naturally, payoffs are determined by two matrices, A , which is m n  , for the first population, and B , which is n m  , for the second population. 
It is especially worth emphasizing that x can be regarded as the vector of rowstrategy distribution among the first population in the evolutionary sense on the one hand, it, on the other hand, can also be interpreted as the frequencies of the actions of the representative row-player. Similarly, we can consider the vector y in the same way. Thus, as in Hofbauer and Hopkins (2005) , we formally give, Defi nition 1 (Belief-learning dynamics in well-mixed populations)
The representative row-player's belief about the actions of the representative columnplayer is characterized by the following learning dynamics, 
 
BR y are typically not functions but correspondences. Nevertheless, one may also consider some specifi c best-response functions, for example, the exponential or logit choice rule (see, Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002) ,
    denote the noise levels, respectively. And when the noise level approaches zero, logit choice approaches unperturbed maximization; when the noise level approaches infi nity, it approaches uniform randomization. Therefore, in well-mixed populations and for the present continuous-time repeated game, one can defi ne, Problem 1. The optimization problem facing the representative row-player is given by, 
As one can see, such kind of optimization problem may be involved in optimization subject to non-linear constraints, which hence implies that we generally cannot adopt the neo-classical optimization methodology and dual approach proposed in Ivanov and Dobreva (2010) for the studying of labor supply issues. In the above constructions, we just consider the ideal case of well-mixed populations. However, in reality, individuals live in a structured society. That is, there must exist social-network effect which indeed affects the payoffs of the players. In particular, in the current study we incorporate social-network effect by two vectors,
denoting the corresponding domains, respectively. As you can see, we characterize the social-network effect from the perspective that social-network structure affects the frequencies individuals meet each other in the underlying game. For example, in social interactions, people usually have much higher frequencies to interact with families and neighbors than the remaining people in a given community. What is more, individuals have higher frequencies to interact with people who live in the same community than the people live in any other remaining communities. So, any social-network structure produces the corresponding social-network effect either through the spatial factors such as communities and neighborhoods or based on social collections such as roommate relationship and friendship among the individuals. And these social phenomena suffi ciently capture the intuition and essence of our defi nition of the social-network effect in the model. Now, with the exogenous social-network effect defined above, the average payoffs of strategies i and j are respectively given by Additionally, in order to verify that Defi nition 4 is actually well-defi ned we will introduce the following numerical example to reveal the corresponding desirability.
Example 1. Suppose that the payoff matrices have the following numerical characteristic,
which shows that we are considering an asymmetric coordination game, i.e., a normal-form game that is widely used and applied in game theory and economic theory. Thus, for the representative row-player in Problem 3, we have,
About the underlying belief-learning dynamics, we specifi cally choose the broadly employed logit choice rule that is introduced in Remark 2.1, i.e.,
In particular, we adopt the following learning process,
where W denotes a standard Brownian motion, i.e., we consider the case of stochastic learning dynamics driven by stochastic replicator dynamics. Hence, the optimization problem facing the representative row-player can be written as follows,
The corresponding Bellman equation can be expressed as follows,
J y representing the value function, which is a   1 r C r  map in this formulation. Therefore, optimal choice of 1 x is determined by the following first-order condition, C r  map with respect to x . And we leave the details to the interested reader. To summarize, game equilibrium in Definition 4 is well-defined and the existence of such kind of game equilibrium endogenously affected by social networks is confirmed in such a numerical example.
Social-Network Effect
Based on Defi nition 2 and Defi nition 4, we give,
: ,
which is a   1 r C r  map with respect to its arguments based upon our specifications.
From Assumption 1 and also the following assumptions, one can easily fi nd that the present model mainly focuses on mixed-strategy equilibrium emphasized by the seminal papers of Harsanyi (1973) and Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) , and among others.
Transversality will be suffi ciently used in the following proof. About the defi nition of transversality, one can refer to Marsden et al. (2001, pp. 179) , and one can refer to Hirsch (1976, pp. 74 ) about the Transversality Theorem and refer to Hirsch (1976, pp. 79-80) about the Parametric Transversality Theorem. Moreover, about Preimage Theorem, one can refer to Guillemin and Pollack (1974, pp. 21 ). And we bring the idea employed by Citanna and Siconolfi (2010) to our major proof. 
Proof:
It is easily seen that the proof is quite similar to that of Proposition 1, thus we omit it. ♦
Defi nition 5 (Independence of game equilibrium)
We mean independence of game equilibrium in social networks in the following sense: the corresponding game equilibrium essentially changes when a non-trivial social-network structure is imposed on the underlying well-mixed population. That is, independence of game equilibrium in social networks implies that we can hardly approximate the game equilibrium in social networks through that relatively easily derived in well-mixed populations and this defi nition of independence has nothing to do with that of probabilistic independence.
To summarize, we can establish,
Theorem 1 (Independence)
Provided the above constructions, social-network effect indeed generates nontrivial differences among the resulting mixed-strategy game equilibria when the corresponding dimensional constraints in Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 are fulfi lled.
Remark 3.1. Theorem 1 implies that, for some important and also interesting cases, one can hardly approximate the game equilibrium in social networks via that in a well-mixed population by using the random-matching rule. Although the methodology of random matching (e.g., Gilboa and Matsui, 1992; Aliprantis et al., 2007 , and among others) indeed plays a crucial role in equilibrium selection of (evolutionary) game theory, it would probably provide us with wrong or biased predictions about the equilibrium behaviors of individuals in many important and also interesting social networks discussed in Theorem 1. For example, we may conjecture that the equilibrium derived by randommatching mechanism in well-mixed populations cannot approach the equilibrium in social networks even when the corresponding social network approaches the state of well-mixed population provided the social-network effect defi ned above vanishes. In other words, the game equilibrium in social networks should be of independent interest. Moreover, this result holds with certain stability and also in generic sense thanks to the well-known Transversality Theorem. Now, we are encouraged to consider the following 
Proof:
We fi rst put,
And for any integer 0 k  , let, 
Proposition 4
Based upon Assumption 4 and the above specifications, there is an open and dense subset
  when the derivative of the map  with respect to x is surjective.
Proof:
One can easily notice that the proof is quite similar to that of Proposition 3, we take it as omitted and leave it to the interested reader. ♦
Defi nition 6 (Uniqueness of game equilibrium)
We discuss uniqueness of game equilibrium in a given social network. For a given social network, the corresponding game equilibrium is a map of the underlying socialnetwork effect (or social-network structure). If different social-network effects lead to different game equilibria or equivalently the same game equilibrium implies that there exists the same social-network effect, we get the game equilibrium as an injective map of the social-network effect. As a result, injection means uniqueness of the game equilibrium in a given social network.
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness)
The game equilibrium given in Defi nition 4 is injective with respect to the socialnetwork effect when either Proposition 3 or Proposition 4 holds. This yields that different social-network effects produce effective differences among the resulting game equilibria when the corresponding dimensional constraints are satisfi ed. Thus, naturally, there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the social-network structure and the mixed-strategy equilibrium. That is to say, the uniqueness of the mixed-strategy game equilibrium in a given social network is identifi ed.
Remark 3.3. It is especially worth noting that the above result holds with certain stability and also in generic sense owing to the Transversality Theorem. By this theorem, one can conclude that different social networks would be of independent interest if they indeed produce different social-network effects in the sense of our specifi cation. To sum up, social-network mechanism provides a unique prediction of the equilibrium behaviors of the individuals involved in the underlying game.
Corollary 1
The property Uniqueness in Theorem 2 implies the property Independence established in Theorem 1.
Proof:
It is easily seen that Assumption 3 implies Assumption 1 and also Assumption 4 implies Assumption 2, which accordingly yields the required result. ♦ Remark 3.4. This observation also demonstrates the inherent consistency of the underlying model specification. Notice that the above assumptions have provided the minimum requirements of the corresponding dimensional constraints of properties Independence and Uniqueness, we have thus shown the biggest sets of social networks in which Independence and Uniqueness hold true, respectively.
Conclusion
In current study, topological analyses about the social-network effect on game equilibrium have been thoroughly provided. It would be very interesting to explore the game equilibrium in social networks rather than well-mixed populations (see, Weibull, 1995; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003, and among others) , and the paper provides a simple and general framework for this issue. Nevertheless, we just study exogenous social-network effect in the sense of Skyrms and Pemantle (2000) in the present limited model. Moreover, the paper mainly focuses on mixed-strategy equilibrium emphasized by the seminal papers of Harsanyi (1973) and Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) .
Two major conclusions are established in the model. Firstly, generally speaking, nontrivial social network induces game equilibrium strictly different from that in wellmixed populations. Secondly, it is interesting to find that the game equilibrium exhibits injective property with respect to the social-network effect under consideration. That is, we have proved the uniqueness of mixed-strategy game equilibrium in a given social network. Therefore, we argue that the game equilibrium in social networks would be of independent interest and random-matching rule (see, Ellison, 1994; Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite, 1995; Weibull, 1995; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003 , and among others) cannot always provide us with a compelling approximation. Finally, it is shown that uniqueness implies independence for a wide range of social networks. And we have even derived the biggest sets of social networks in which independence and uniqueness hold true, respectively, in the underlying game.
What are the economic implications of the main results established in the paper? On the one hand, even though the theory of game equilibrium in well-mixed populations has been thoroughly established in the past several decades and the importance of socialnetwork effect imposed on game equilibria and economic outcomes has been sufficiently emphasized in recent studies, there still is not a general conclusion regarding the internal relation between the both. The paper demonstrates an impossibility theorem by confirming the independence of game equilibrium in social networks. This impossibility theorem argues that we can hardly predict the equilibrium behaviors in social networks when we only have information about the original well-mixed populations. That is to say, since the players choose their best strategies based on the information of the game context, our result implies that social-network structures produce relevant information that is essential in determining equilibrium behaviors. Rather, one may even argue that game equilibria in social networks are of independent interest mainly because social networks themselves produce informational frictions facing the players when compared to the original wellmixed world. On the other hand, uniqueness of game equilibrium in a given social network not only leads us to the corresponding independence of game equilibrium but also makes things much easier when evaluating economic welfare of different social networks. Noting that we can comparatively easily Pareto rank different game equilibrium according to the corresponding payoffs, we can thus Pareto rank different social networks by applying the uniqueness property. As is well known, social networks are usually formed by social norms, conventions and\or institutions. Consequently, one can directly Pareto rank different social norms or institutions based upon our general result. In particular, we have to some extent modeled the underlying idea of Coase (1988) that we need a baseline framework to comparatively and sufficiently evaluate the economic efficiency of different institutional arrangements in order to make a wise choice during the corresponding institutional changes in reality.
As a final point, I'd like to cite some examples in existing articles to make our general arguments much more intuitive. First, the simple model constructed in Dai and Cheng (2011) can be regarded as a special application of the Independence property demonstrated in this paper. As is widely known, (Defect, Defect) is the unique Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stable equilibrium (ESE) of Prisoner's Dilemma in a well-mixed population (see, Weibull, 1995; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003 , and among others). However, Dai and Cheng (2011) prove that there is a non-random matching mechanism, which naturally corresponds to a special type of social-network structure (or effect), such that (Cooperate, Cooperate) is the unique induced game equilibrium. That is to say, social-network effect does make sense and game equilibria in some social networks are of independent interest relative to those in well-mixed populations. Second, as is emphasized above, Uniqueness not only implies Independence but also yields interesting economic-welfare implications. Dai (2012) indeed reveals a general existence of the Pareto-optimal social-network structure in any given evolutionary normal-form game. Moreover, in a much simpler example, Dai and Cheng (2011) prove that there exists an optimal and stable level of social segmentation, which also results in a special type of social network, so that the welfare of the community is maximized under the background of Prisoner's Dilemma. Notice that Dai and Cheng (2011), and Dai (2012) only confirm the existence of Pareto-optimal social networks in evolutionary normal-form games, the present paper further demonstrates the underlying Uniqueness property, thereby making the Pareto ranking of different social networks much easier in large and general normal-form games. As a consequence, what are the corresponding lessons we have learned from this paper? On the one hand, like rational principle, evolutionary selection and learning mechanism, we can similarly use social-network effect as an effective equilibrium-selection mechanism especially when there are multiple equilibria in many social games or spatial games. On the other hand, the general result established in the paper also shows that we can design a unique socialnetwork structure through formal social institutions or informal social norms to induce the Pareto-optimal game equilibrium of structured populations in real-world economies.
